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A Social Responsibility View of the "Patent-Centric
Linear Model" of University Technology Transfer
ChristopherS. Hayter*
ABSTRACT

Research universities are increasingly recognized for their role in
regional and national economic prosperity. The contributionsof research universities are primarily related to their role in the production and dissemination of new knowledge into society, including
through the education of students.
New knowledge is the seed corn of innovation, and thus drives social and economic development. Given that research universitiesare
sanctioned by society as non-profit, publicly-charteredorganizations
devoted to the public good, this articleposits that their primary responsibility related to the production of new knowledge-especially
new knowledge flowing from federally-funded research-isits rapid
dissemination. While there are many mechanisms through which
knowledge is disseminated, this articlefocuses on the efficacy of "formal" technology transfer, one particularinterpretationof the Bayh-

Dole Act of 1980.
To this end, I construct a unique analytical framework based on
the voluminous corporate social responsibility ("CSR") literature to
examine specific technology transfer management practices andmost importantly-theirimpact on society. Despite the recent development of licensing practices related to global health and other areas, Inonetheless find that the "Patent-Centric
Linear Model"of university technology transfer is far from socially optimal, often favoring opportunitiesfor revenue generationat the expense of knowledge
dissemination;current interpretationsof Bayh-Dole are socially irresponsible.

* Assistant Professor, Center on Organization Research and Design ("CORD"), School
of Public Affairs, Arizona State University.
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INTRODUCTION

While knowledge creation and dissemination-embodied in research and teaching-have long been responsibilities of colleges
and universities, technology transfer is generally considered part of
what has emerged in policy lexicon as the so-called "fourth mission"
of higher education: economic development.' The emergence of a
fourth mission implies that a university's economic development
mission is distinct from its other three traditional missions: teaching, research, and outreach missions.
Policymakers broadly use the term "technology transfer" to describe specific economic development contributions, including the
establishment of university spinoff companies, the development of
new technologies, employment, and attraction of talented individuals to work in the surrounding region. 2 The focus here, however, is
on a specific interpretationof the University and Small Business
Patent Procedures Act of 1980, otherwise known as the Bayh-Dole
Act. 3 The purpose of Bayh-Dole was to maximize the dissemination
and commercialization of technologies stemming from university
research. 4 This article will discuss one relatively linear, bureaucratic approach: what I term the "Patent-Centric Linear Model" of
university technology transfer.

1. Christopher S. Hayter, Social Responsibility and the Knowledge ProductionFunction
of Higher Education, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE 144
(Cristiano Antonelli & Albert N. Link eds., 2015).
2. See Phillip H. Phan & Donald S. Siegel, The Effectiveness of University Technology
Transfer: Lessons Learned, Managerialand Policy Implications, and the Road Forward, 2
FOUND. & TRENDS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP 77, 77-144 (2006); Frank T. Rothaermel et al., University Entrepreneurship:A Taxonomy of the Literature, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 691,691791 (2007).
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2012).
4. Samantha R. Bradley et al., Models and Methods of University Technology Transfer,
9 FOUND. & TRENDS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP 571, 571 (2013).
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The focus on the relationship between technology transfer and
knowledge dissemination is motivated by several interrelated factors: (1) in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, higher education
has garnered significant attention among policymakers for its potential and realized contributions to economic development; (2) recent cutting-edge economics research has not only provided an understanding of the economic and social value of new knowledge, it
has created awareness of the barriers and enablers to its flow and,
thus, its impact; and (3) a robust and rapidly growing empirical literature examines the structure, operation, and impact of the current technology transfer system.
In order to examine the impact of the Patent-Centric Linear
Model on knowledge dissemination, I develop a social responsibility
framework. Within this context, knowledge production and dissemination is conceptualized as the primary responsibility of higher education, which is not only congruent with the intent of Bayh-Dole,
but also the traditional teaching and research missions of universities.
I find that the Patent-Centric Linear Model is socially irresponsible because it fails to optimize knowledge dissemination and commercialization and, instead, mandates a "review and protect or reject" approach to technology management in hopes of maximizing
licensing revenues. As such, the model neglects the variety of options possible under current legal frameworks that would more
closely align with the realities of technology commercialization and
entrepreneurship. Armed with a broader understanding of how social responsibility is framed within an academic context-and a robust conceptual framework with which to analyze it-it is easy to
understand why and how the current technology transfer system
exists and why it has experienced much tension and criticism.
In support of this analysis, Section I introduces the Patent-Centric Linear Model, which is, according to a recent review of the technology transfer literature, a nearly ubiquitous interpretation of the
Bayh-Dole Act.5 Section II introduces a social responsibility framework specific to the mission of higher education, especially related
to the creation and dissemination of new knowledge. Section III
reviews the economics literature underlying the role of new
knowledge in economic and social development. Section IV articulates the social responsibilities of higher education as they relate to
technology transfer, exploring both existing legal requirements as
well as discretionary options. Section V provides a discussion as to
5.

Bradley et al., supra note 4.
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why the Patent-Centric Linear Model is socially irresponsible, with
conclusions provided in Section VI.
I.

CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT

The Bayh-Dole Act was passed in 1980 in an effort to accelerate
the dissemination and commercialization of new knowledge produced in universities.6 The Bayh-Dole Act provides a specific,
though relatively broad, legal framework regarding the treatment
of inventions resulting from federally funded research.7 Bayh-Dole
was motivated by a perception among policymakers that technolo-

gies derived from federally funded research were "sitting on the
shelf' as a result of excessive bureaucracy and regulation-and a
response to fears that the United States was losing its international
competitiveness. 8 The Act not only aligned intellectual property
("IP") policy among all federal research and development ("R&D")
funding agencies, it also sought to create incentives for universities
to become engaged in the technology transfer process. 9 It did so by
giving universities primary responsibility for managing derivative
technologies, including the ability to claim ownership of said technology via patents. 10
In practice, universities have adopted one specific interpretation
of Bayh-Dole, recently termed the "Traditional Linear Model,"
which defines technology transfer primarily in terms of patenting."
For this article, I refer to this concept as the "Patent-Centric Linear
Model" of university technology transfer. Crucial to this interpretation was the creation and central role of university technology
transfer offices ("TTOs"). Nearly all major research universitiesmore than 200-have established TTOs. 12 Also important to this
interpretation is the fact that the Bayh-Dole Act ties university IP
ownership claims to patents, though a multitude of university
knowledge dissemination and commercialization alternatives exist.13 Finally, a small number of large research universities contributed to this interpretation; many were involved in patenting and
6.
7.

35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212.
Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 576.

8. See DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN
THE UNITED STATES 97-98 (2004); Bhaven N. Sampat, Patentingand US Academic Research

in the 20th Century: The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL'Y 772, 776-77 (2006).
9. Sampat, supra note 8, at 780, 782-83.
10. Id. at 779-80.
11. Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 574-76.
12. Id. at 592-94.
13. Id. at 610, 619-26.
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technology commercialization before Bayh-Dole and served as
highly visible linear-model examples for other research universities. 14 Recent research finds that the linear model not only represents the dominant technology management model for universities-especially within the early stages of developing technology
transfer capability-it also drives conceptual and empirical research on university technology transfer. 15
Figure 1 illustrates the Patent-Centric Linear Model process.
Following the model, a university scientist makes an invention and
(1) discloses the invention to their university's TTO. 16 The TTO
then (2) evaluates the invention and, if viable, (3) files a patent application to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO").17 If
granted, (4) the TTO markets the patented technology to potential
licensees, including large firms, small businesses, and entrepreneurs, or works with the faculty inventor if the inventor is interested in establishing a university spinoff company.18 The TTO then
(5) negotiates the terms of the licensing agreement and (6) licenses
the technology (7) to large companies or (8) spinoff companies. 19

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 571.
See generally id.
Id.
Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 575.
Id.
Id.
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Figure 1: Patent-Centric Linear Model of Technology
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Discussed in the next section, the linear model is a hands-on approach with many possible derivations. For example, many universities begin marketing technologies and negotiating agreements before a patent application is filed, often asking potential licensees to
cover licensing costs. 2 1 But the model presented in Figure 1 represents a general process of evaluating invention disclosures and
their readiness for patenting in hopes of licensing to organizations
outside the university; the model views patents as the primary vehicle for technology transfer.
Within the context of the model, Bayh-Dole has been credited
with an enormous increase in patenting and technology commercialization activity from universities. 22 From 1983 to 2003, the
number of patents issued to universities grew from 434 to 3,259.23
According to the USPTO, 4,797 utility patents were awarded in
2012.24 Further, the Association of University Technology Managers ("AUTM") reported that 818 university spinoff companies were
established in 2013, and that more than 4,200 established over the
course of the past 30 years remained in operation. These activities
have resulted in significant benefits for several universities: $12.5
billion in net licensing income since 2009, $2.8 billion in 2013
alone. 25
Universities have adopted the Patent-Centric Linear Model (or
similar derivations thereof) in pursuit of additional revenue in response to an increasingly competitive higher education marketplace combined with declining or flat funding from state and federal
sources. 26 Further, highly visible university licensing success
among a handful of universities provided a signal to other universities of the licensing revenue potential of the Patent-Centric Linear Model. For example, the so-called Boyer-Cohen patents, filed
in the late 1970s on a pioneering and fundamental technique for the
creation of genetically engineered microorganisms, earned the Uni-

21.
22.

Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 596.

23. Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, 8 INNOVATION POL'Y & THE ECON. 1, 1 (2007).
24. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: UTILITY
PATENT
GRANTS,
CALENDAR
YEARS
1969-2012,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/of-

fices/ac/idooeip/tafuniv/org gr/all univ ag.htm (last visited May 10, 2015).
25.

Association of University Technology Managers, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY

SURVEY: FY 2013, at 32 [hereinafter AUTM].
26. Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 608-09.
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versity of California and Stanford University more than $255 million in licensing revenue during their 17-year patent life.27 Similarly, the most successful universities can have annual licensing
revenue in the range of $20-$60 million, with the upper bound well
above $100 million.28
A.

Reexamining the Patent-CentricLinearModel

When evaluating the impact of policy, analysts typically turn to
the concept of the counter-factual: What would have been the outcome if a policy or program had not been implemented? 29 For this
article, it is clear from a number of metrics that universities are
increasingly disclosing technology, patenting, licensing, and spinning off new companies. But to what extent are these activities a
specific outcome of Bayh-Dole and, for purposes of this article, the
linear model?
Professors Richard C. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, and Arvids Z.
Ziedonis investigated the larger of the aforementioned questionsthe overall impact of Bayh-Dole-and found that many research
universities had a history of transferring technologies to industry
long before 1980.30 They also posit that, while the Act may have
created marginal administrative efficiencies, many other factors
also contributed to the growth of university technology transfer activity, including large increases in federal research funding (especially in life sciences), the increasing importance of early-stage
R&D within nascent industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals), and the
rapid development of information and communication technologies
that not only enabled more robust collaboration, but also allowed
individuals to learn about the technology transfer activities of other
institutions. 31
Research more narrowly focused on the Patent-Centric Linear
Model found that it is at best simplistic: technology creation, dissemination, development, and adoption differ by discipline, institution, and industry, among other facets. 32 As a heuristic, the model
is not only misleading with regard to how university technology
transfer actually occurs, it distracts scholars and policymakers from

27.

Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Reconsideringthe Bayh-Dole Act and the Current

University Invention OwnershipModel, 38 RES. POL'Y 1407, 1409 (2009).
28. AUTM, supra note 25, at 67-71.
29. See Adam B. Jaffe, Building Programme Evaluation Into the Design of Public Research-Support Programmes, 18 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y 22 (2002).
30. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 38-57.

31.

Sampat, supra note 8, at 784-86.

32.

See, e.g., ERIC VON HIPPLE, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 3-7 (1988).
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how it could occur, especially given its focus on patents. 33 Finally,
at worst, the model can slow or even inhibit the dissemination of
new knowledge into society. 34 This investigation carefully examines the Patent-Centric Linear Model through a social responsibility lens, with the next section establishing the relevant conceptual
framework.

II.

SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

Higher education institutions were established hundreds of years
ago to contribute to the public good of society. 35 Surprisingly, a recent review of the extant higher education literature finds that discussions of how social responsibility is defined and, more importantly, how responsibility manifests in the decisions, management practices, and impact of colleges and universities is woefully
underdeveloped. This is in contrast to the expansive and rapidly
growing body of scholarship relating to corporate social responsibility ("CSR"). 36
A.

The Emergence of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Social Performance

While the objective function of the firm is typically viewed as
profit generation, CSR-a concept deeply embedded within business school literature-examines a broader question: What are the
overall contributions that firms make to society? 3 7 A voluminous
and rapidly growing literature seeks to address this question.
CSR emerged in the 1950s largely as a normative exercise with
Howard Bowen, author of Social Responsibilities of the Businessman.38 Considered the father of CSR, Bowen posited that business
serves at the pleasure of society, so its behavior and actions must
conform to society's expectations. 39 Thus, a social contract-a set of
implied rights and affirmative obligations-is the foundation for
business legitimacy. First among these obligations is the economic
33.

See generally Bradley et al., supra note 4; Kenney & Patton, supra note 27.

34.

Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 611-12.

35. See JOHN R. THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 1-5 (2d ed. 2011).
36. Hayter, supra note 1, at 136.
37. See Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 497 (1979) [hereinafter CorporatePerformance].
38. HOWARD R. BOWEN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESSMAN 28-30
(1953).
39. Id.; see also S. Prakash Sethi, Dimensions of CorporateSocial Performance:An Analytical Framework, 17 CAL. MGMT. REV. 58, 62 (1975) (positing "social responsibility implies
bringing corporate behavior up to a level where it is congruent with the prevailing norms,
values, and expectations of performance").
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role profit motive plays, followed by a business's ethical obligations. 40 As Bowen's ideas gained traction, conversations focused on
the normative aspects of social responsibility: What should businesses do to benefit society? 41
Professor Archie Carroll, considered one of the preeminent experts on CSR, identified a key problem with early approaches: normative discussions of social responsibility were, up until the late
1970s, largely separated from discussions relating to mainstream
business management practices. 42 The most important responsibility of companies, Carroll argued, is generating returns for their
shareholders. 43 Thus, discussions were needed relating to how
businesses can be socially responsible, not just what social responsibility means.
Carroll's ideas are manifested in the Corporate Social Performance ("CSP") model, which includes legal and ethical responsibilities in addition to profit-generation obligations. 4 4 Introduced in
1979, the CSP model has evolved into one of the most influential
conceptual frameworks within what scholars term the "business
and society" literature. 45 Early CSP models emphasized the importance of being responsive to social obligations. 46 While CSR focuses on determining social obligations, CSP is complementary, focusing on how firms best fulfill these goals. 47 This obligation-performance link was strengthened in the 1980s and 1990s with the
emergence of Professor Michael Porter's Competitive Advantage
Model, which states that firms create value by combining strategy
and adaptation to external contexts. 4 8 Specific to CSR, stakeholder

40. See CorporatePerformance, supra note 37, at 500; Archie B. Carroll, CorporateSocial
Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct, 38 BUs. & SOC'Y 268 (1999) [hereinafter
CorporateSocial Responsibility].
41. See CorporatePerformance, supra note 37, at 500.
42. Id. at 498.
43. Id. at 500.
44. Id.
45. See Diane L. Swanson, Toward an Integrative Theory of Business and Society: A Research Strategy for Corporate Social Performance, 24 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 506, 507 (1999).
46. Id. at 506.
47. See Steven L. Wartick & Philip L. Cochran, The Evolution of the Corporate Social
Performance Model, 10 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 758, 758 (1985). Despite Carroll's early inten-

tions, scholars continue to criticize the lack of integration between normative aspects of CSR
and business activity. Therefore, social responsibility may be integrated into the strategy
and operations of firms and, in the case of the Synergistic Value Creation model, may help
create unforeseen value. For additional information, see Elisabet Garriga & Dombnec Mel6,
Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory, 53 J. OF Bus. ETHICS 51,
59-60 (2004).
48. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 71-87, 126-55 (1980).
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demands for social investments, philanthropy, and catering to underserved populations can be seen as an important marketing opportunity for firms. 49
In the 21st century, CSP has co-evolved with other derivative CSR
frameworks, integrating social responsibility into real-world management practices.5 0 CSP provides an integrated approach to social
responsibility: When core business functions are aligned with social
impact, both society and business can benefit.5 1 An emergent literature shows that businesses that adopt such a strategic approach
enjoy a number of benefits, including improved financial performance. 52

The Social Responsibility and Higher Education

B.

The creation of wealth remains the most important and appropriate objective function of industry. Conversely, colleges and universities are de facto social organizations originally established to advance the public good. 53 For example, the social responsibility of
American colleges was reflected in colonial charters, and provided
the motivating logic behind the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 that
led to the establishment of the nation's land-grant universities, agriculture experiment stations, and cooperative extension service. 5 4
In the 2 0 th century, the social mission of emerging public institutions was reflected in their (typically) non-profit status and receipt
of substantial public funding, especially regular appropriations
from state governments.5 5 Social responsibility was also a critical
dimension of the 1947 Truman Commission Report, which recommended the establishment of a nation-wide network of community
colleges and financial aid for students of limited means, the latter

49.

See, e.g., Peter F. Drucker, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 26

CAL. MGMT. REV. 53, 60-62 (1984).
50. Wartick & Cochran, supra note 47, at 765-67.
51.

See Bryan W. Husted, A Contingency Theory of Corporate Social Performance, 39

Bus. & Soc'Y 24 (2000).
52. See Bryan W. Husted & Jos6 De Jesus Salazar, Taking FriedmanSeriously: Maximizing Profits and Social Performance, 43 J. OF MGMT. STUD. 75 (2006) (arguing that a strategic approach to social responsibility not only results in better financial performance due to
strategic behavior, it also yields far greater social performance compared to alternative approaches such as corporate altruism).

53.

Hayter, supranote 1, at 141.

54. See, e.g., GEORGE R. MCDOWELL, LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITIES AND EXTENSION INTO
THE 21ST CENTURY: RENEGOTIATING OR ABANDONING ASOCIAL CONTRACT 16-17 (2001); Hayter, supra note 1, at 141.

55.

THELIN, supra note 35, at 4-5, 137-141.
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of which led indirectly to the Higher Education Act of 1965 and its
subsequent reauthorizations.56
In a previous article, I comprehensively reviewed the extant
higher education literature and found that very little exists in the
way of a scholarly or practice-oriented body of knowledge relating
to the identification and fulfillment of social responsibilities within
an academic context.57 This is ironic given that society confers
many valuable privileges in support of higher education's important
public mission. These benefits include exemptions from income,
property, and sales taxes; tax-exempt debt or bond authority (depending on the state);5 8 preferred eligibility for federal grants and
contracts; favorable treatment of charitable giving; and-in the
case of public universities-regular (albeit declining) state subsidies, among other benefits. 59 Thus, rhetorically, what are the specific social responsibilities of colleges and universities-and the policy and programmatic (typically public) systems that support
them-and to what extent are these groups collectively fulfilling
these responsibilities?
C.

A Social PerformanceFramework for Higher Education

The introduction of CSR, with an emphasis on the CSP framework, is motivated by the need for a practical approach to defining
and articulating the specific social responsibilities of colleges and
universities, practices best suited to meeting them, and the extent
to which they are met. In deference to Professor Carroll, this article
introduces a social performance conceptual framework for higher
education. Similar to its corporate cousin, a higher education-focused social performance model emphasizes the impact of colleges
and universities on society with a focus on practice: the efficacy of
specific higher education management techniques, policies, and
programs. While ideas of social value exist, the framework draws
heavily from CSP given the well-developed nature of the supporting

56. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUC., HIGHER EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1947).

57.

Hayter, supranote 1, at 146-47.

58.

See An Education in Finance, ECONOMIST (May 18, 2006),

http://www.econo-

mist.com/node/6958688.; Stephen E. Weyl & Ronald F. Rodgers, Tax-Exempt Bonds: Considerationsfor College and University In-House Counsel, in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE
AND UNIVERSITY ATTORNEYS: PUBLICATION SERIES 1-2 (2006); Ry Rivard, The Lure of Taxable
Debt,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED,
(July
21),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/07/2 1/lure-research-and-avoid-regulations-some-universities-turnaway-tax-exempt-bonds.

59.

Hayter, supranote 1, at 141.
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empirical literature, as well as the more competitive and revenueoriented nature of higher education markets.
Similar to CSR, the social performance model embraces legal and
discretionary obligations but replaces profit generation with the responsibility to fulfill the university mission. Thus, social responsibility of colleges and universities depends on their ability to fulfill
their mission, while also fulfilling their legal and discretionary requirements to society. This is not to say that revenues are not important. Quite the opposite-financial resources are needed to support scale and impact. However, revenue generation must necessarily follow other responsibilities for a number of reasons discussed below. Especially critical is the designation of (most) higher
education institutions as tax-exempt organizations and the derivative emphasis on the public-good elements relating to knowledge
creation and dissemination.
Most importantly, a social performance model motivates strategic thinking within higher education. Referring to the discussion of
strategy above, it is likely wrong to suggest that a college or university can address all social issues. Thus, in order for higher education to maximize its social impact, it must first be selective as to the
scope of its mission (i.e. focus what responsibility or responsibilities
it chooses to be "world class" in). The more responsibilities that
higher education takes on, the more it may diminish the impact of
other responsibilities. The next section reviews the existing economics literature to explain why the dissemination of new
knowledge is an important university responsibility, especially as
that obligation relates to the university's role in economic and social
development.

III.

A UNIVERSITY'S KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION MISSION: AN
ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE

Research and teaching are critical responsibilities of higher education. The American notion of the research university traces its
roots back to the establishment of Johns Hopkins University

("JHU") in 1876.60

JHU's first President, Daniel Coit Gilman,

sought to revolutionize higher education by advocating a model of
advanced discovery and scholarship similar to that used in Germany. 61 However, he felt that, given the relative paucity of tech-

60. THELIN, supra note 35, at 103-04.
61. Id. at 241; see also John C. Scott, The Mission of the University:Medieval to Postmodern Transformations, 77 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 1, 3, 15, 22-23 (2006).
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nical capabilities within the United States, research responsibilities needed to be closely integrated with the historical teaching mission of higher education. 62 This "hybrid" research-teaching model
of education was influential among existing universities at the
time, as well as in establishment of the emergent public land grant
universities. 63
While early support for university research came from the institutions themselves, along with a few charitable organizations, this
began to change during the Second World War. Vannevar Bush,
science advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, advocated for
federal support for academic research due to its importance in addressing issues of national security, human health, and commerce. 64 Bush's ideas eventually led to the formation of the National Science Foundation, 65 and helped shape contemporary notions of universities as knowledge-production assets important for
national well-being. While other research funding sources (i.e. industry- and foundation-sponsored research) have grown in relative
terms, the federal government remains the largest sponsor of academic research, providing more than $67 billion in 2013 to universities, nearly half of the federal government's $140 billion research
budget.66
A.

The Role of Knowledge in Economic and Social Development

The production function constitutes one of the foundational theoretical concepts in economics, whereby the input of labor and capital
result in economic output.6 7 In the 1950s economists-led by Robert

62.
63.

Scott, supra note 61, at 22-23.
Id.

64. See OFFICE OF SCI. RES. & DEV., SCIENCE, THE ENDLESS FRONTIER: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1945).
65. The National Science Foundation, the primary principal funder of basic university
research in the United States, was established in 1950. The primary purpose of the NSF is
to organize and award research grants through competitive, peer-review processes. See A
Timeline of NSF History, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/about/history/overview-

50.jsp (last visited December 11, 2015).
66. See Ronda Britt, Higher Education Research and Development Survey: Fiscal Year
2013,
NAT'L
CTR.
FOR
SCI.
AND
ENG'G
STATISTICS
(July
31,
2014),
http://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/herd/2013/.
67. See Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J.

ECON. 65, 66 (1956).
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Solow-began to account for the role of knowledge within the production function. 68 This role was later termed the "knowledge production function," 69 the inputs for which are R&D, human capital,
and/or academic research. 70
Several decades of empirical research finds that the knowledge
production function holds true at a macroeconomic level of aggregation: The most innovative countries are those with the greatest investments in R&D, just as less developed countries typically generate little new knowledge.7 1 Similarly, the most innovative industries tend to be characterized by relatively large R&D investments. 72 Thus, at a macro level, knowledge is a critical source of
innovation, economic dynamism, and growth. 73
At least two policy options exist to assist production levels in
reaching what economists term "socially optimal" levels. The first
is formal intellectual property protection, providing a potential incentive for innovation by granting a temporary monopoly to creators so they have the opportunity to reap a return from their creation and-in the case of patents-promote disclosure to society. 74
The second policy option is to encourage knowledge production
through research subsidies, which is demonstrated by the substantial levels of public R&D funding.75 These policies are complementary, depending on the context in which they are used.76
Professor Paul Romer later introduced his endogenous growth
theory, whereby economic growth occurs through the generation,
accumulation, and spillover of new technological knowledge.7 7
Building on Arrow's ideas, Romer not only assumed that knowledge
is the seed corn for innovation (and, thus, economic and social development), he also believed that new knowledge, once created, "automatically" spills over, allowing third-party firms and economic

68.
69.

Id. at 68.
See Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators:A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LIT.

1661, 1671-72 (1990).
70.

See DAVID B. AUDRETSCH ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 34-

36, 51-59 (2006).
71. Id. at 170-86.
72. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609,
626 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. ed., 1962); Paul M. Romer, IncreasingReturns and Long-Run

Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002, 1034 (1986).
73. Romer, supra note 72, at 1034.
74. See Diana Rhoten & Walter W. Powell, The Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Expanded Protection Versus New Models of Open Science, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 345, 348-

49 (2007).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Arrow, supra note 72, at 1018-20, 1034.
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agents access to new technological knowledge.78 Thus, endogenous
growth theory became a critical rationale/justification for ever-increasing public expenditures for public R&D.
Recent advances in economics research by Professors Zoltan Acs,
David Audretsch, Bo Carlsson, and Pontus Braunjerhelm, among
others, cast new light on Romer's work.
Embodied in the
Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship ("KSTE"), their
works embrace Solow and Romer's contention that new knowledge
is critical to economic growth. 79 However, KSTE takes issue with
traditional theoretical assumptions that all knowledge is economically useful and spills over "automatically."8 0 Instead, knowledge is
subject to institutional, geographic, and cost constraints.8 1
The dynamics of knowledge spillovers are also affected by the
properties of knowledge itself.8 2

First, the economic value of

knowledge is relatively uncertain, especially compared to the more
certain nature of information. 83 Second, knowledge is characterized
by asymmetry across economic agents; the same knowledge may be
assigned different values-or have different expected values-by
different individuals. Third, while the transaction cost for sharing
information across economic agents is trivial, transmitting
knowledge may require longer-term and proximate communication,
thus increasing transaction costs.

84

Fundamental to this last point is well-established differences between codified and tacit knowledge.8 5 Codified knowledge is embodied in the form of books, articles, blueprints, software programs,
and other vehicles often protected by copyright. 86
Codified
knowledge is easily transmitted across distances and among
agents; a consumer does not necessarily need to be the originator of
codified knowledge to enjoy its benefits. Academic publications are
an example of codified knowledge. On the other hand, tacit
78.

Id.

79.

See Zoltan J. Acs et al., The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship, 41

SMALL BUS. ECON. 757, 759-61 (2013).
80. Id. at 759-61.
81. See, e.g., Paul Almeida & Bruce Kogut, Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility
of Engineers in Regional Networks, 45 MGMT. SCI. 905 (1999); Janet Bercovitz & Maryann
Feldman, Academic Entrepreneurs:OrganizationalChange at the Individual Level, 19 ORG.

SCI. 69 (2008).
82. See David B. Audretsch et al., From Knowledge to Innovation: The Role of Knowledge
Spillover Entrepreneurship, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE

21-22 (Cristiano Antonelli & Albert N. Link eds., 2015).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85.

See Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities,

and the Replication of Technology, 3 ORG. SCI. 383, 387-88 (1992).
86. Id.
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knowledge-referred to as know-how-is not easily codified. Rather, this type of knowledge is highly specialized and is typically
embodied in individuals, organizations, and processes.8 7 Research
shows that as knowledge becomes more valuable (i.e. evolves toward application), it becomes more "sticky"-more difficult to transmit and, therefore, more place-based.8 8
Within a university context, inventions emerge from years of academic research experience and are thus an example of tacit
knowledge embedded within faculty, students, and long-established
facilities and processes. Discussed later, patents are an intermediate output that codifies key elements of an invention, but patents
do not and cannot completely capture the full value of knowledge
generated during academic research. Nor do patents, even licensed
patents, signify the "complete" exchange of knowledge. 89 Research
shows that the transmission of technical knowledge is instead dependent on the existence of robust social networks and shared technical capabilities of the transmitting parties. 90
Thus, the operative question when discussing knowledge spillover is: To what extent do university organizational structures, practices, and policies enable the dissemination and commercialization
of knowledge? In other words, how well do universities disseminate
and commercialize their newly generated knowledge?
B.

Knowledge Disseminationand Higher Education
1.

Publication, Teaching, and Service

While most discussions regarding the role of knowledge in economic and social development have focused on knowledge inputs
(i.e. R&D funding), only recently have scholars turned to questions
of how and why knowledge spillover occurs. 91 Scholarly publications and conference presentations serve as the most traditional

87.

See David B. Audretsch & Maryann Feldman, R&D Spillovers and the Geography of

Innovation and Production, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 630, 638 (1996); see also MOWERY ET AL., su-

pra note 8, at 175.
88. See Eric von Hippel, "Sticky Information"and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation, 40 MGMT. SCI. 429 (1994).
89. Bronwyn Hall et al., The Choice Between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property:

A Review, 52 J. ECON. LIT. 375, 376-77 (2014).
90. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, 141-56 (1996); Martin Kenney & U von Burg, Technology,
Entrepreneurshipand Path Dependence: Industrial Clustering in Silicon Valley and Route
128, 8 INDUS. AND CORP. CHANGE 67, 71 (1999).
91. See Acs et al., supra note 79.
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and widely accepted forms of knowledge dissemination within
higher education. 92 However, many other forms exist. 93
Education is a long-accepted responsibility of colleges and universities-and perhaps the oldest form of knowledge dissemination.
In 1858, Cardinal John Henry Newman's The Idea of a University
Defined and Illustrated posited that universities benefited society
by educating gentlemen with "a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste,
a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, [and] a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life . . . ."94 In many ways, American
colleges established early in the nation's history reflected this
view. 95 Early exceptions included the establishment of the United
States Military Academy at West Point and, later, the establishment of American Land Grant universities to meet the military
leadership and engineering needs of a rapidly-growing nation. 96
In the 2 0 th century, higher education rapidly evolved from a luxury largely reserved for the wealthy, to a large and increasingly accessible public enterprise designed to meet the educational needs of
the country. 97 In addition to providing a general education to students, this "massification" of higher education was a way to transmit new knowledge into society while meeting critical local and national workforce needs, such as the nation-wide demand for highly
qualified math and science teachers. 98
The "third" mission of higher education, public engagement and
outreach, is another way to disseminate knowledge into society. 99
Service can relate to the actions of students, faculty, and staff.1 00
Service learning programs, for example, combine curricular objectives with community-oriented goals in an effort to meet higher education's responsibility to educate civic-minded individuals, especially undergraduates.1 0 1 Other types of engagement and outreach
92.

See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., Links and Impacts: The Influence of Public Research

on IndustrialR&D, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1, 14, 16-17 (2002) (noting other mechanisms of university
knowledge dissemination might include students, informal collaboration, consulting and entrepreneurship).

93.

Id. at 16-17.

94.

JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY 91 (Martin J. Svaglic

ed., 1960).
95. Id.
96.
97.
98.

THELIN, supra note 35, at 42-43.
Id. at 156-57.
Christopher Hayter, A Compact for Postsecondary Education, NAT'L GOVERNORS

ASS'N 1, 10-12 (2007), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/
pdf/0707INNOVATIONPOSTSEC.PDF; Judith A. Ramaley, Scholarshipfor the Public Good:
Living in Pasteur's Quadrant, in HIGHER EDUCATION FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD 166, 170 (Adrianna J. Kezar et al., eds., 2005).
99. Hayter, supranote 1, at 143.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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programs, such as agriculture and education extension programs,
aid in the transmission of knowledge while providing a vehicle to
understand and address society's needs. 102
2.

Formal University Technology Transfer

To reiterate, the current formal technology transfer system is
based on one interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Related
research finds that knowledge dissemination is typically conceptualized by both practitioners and scholars as a relatively linear process that includes invention disclosure, patenting, and licensingincluding licensing to new spinoff companies established by faculty
and students. 103 Patents serve as a mechanism for appropriating
new knowledge and disclosing it to society and, thus, act as a type
of proxy for knowledge dissemination. 10 4 This formal transfer of
technology has led to numerous innovations in the form of new
products and processes and, at least as related to university
spinoffs, has made modest but important contributions to regional
economies through the development of new technologies, employment, and wealth creation. 105
3.

Informal University Technology Transfer to Industry

While formal technology transfer has evolved substantially over
the past 35 years, informal technology transfer (beyond the aforementioned knowledge dissemination mechanisms) has occurred for
far longer. Professors Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis found substantial evidence of various forms of university technology transfer, including formal and informal mechanisms, occurring long before the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.106
Informal technology transfer has long been important within the
context of innovation, with patenting and licensing typically among
the least important mechanisms for disseminating knowledge. For
example, recent research finds that the most important mechanisms for knowledge transfer from universities include (in order):
scientific output (typically transferred in the form of publications
102. MCDOWELL, supra note 54, at 3-14.
103. See Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 575.
104. Hall et al., supranote 89, at 376-77.
105. For example, AUTM reported that 818 university spinoff companies were established
in 2013, with more than 4,200 established over the course of the past 30 years remaining in
operation. These activities have resulted in significant benefits for several universities: $12.5
billion in net licensing income since 2009, $2.8 billion in 2013 alone. See AUTM, supra note
25, at 11, 32.
106. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 8, at 35-57

Winter 2016

Patent-Centric Linear Model

27

and conference presentations), informal contact with faculty and
students, connections to future employees (students), and collaborative and contract research, with patenting and licensing ranking
last.10 7 These findings were duplicated in a study conducted by Professor Cohen and his colleagues, who found that publications, open
scientific communication, and consulting are the ways that firms
most benefit from university research; patents and licensing rank
last.10 8 In addition, an MIT study found that only seven percent of
knowledge transfer is accomplished through the use of patents;
publication and other channels are more important vehicles for
sharing knowledge. 109
In related lines of research, Professors Albert Link, Donald
Siegel, and Barry Bozeman refer to formal technology transfer as
an instrument of law, whereas, with informal technology transfer,
property rights play a secondary (if not negligible) role.110 In support of their inquiry, they conceive of informal technology transfer
as faculty (1) working directly with industry personnel to transfer
or commercialize technology, (2) consulting to an industrial firm (if
separate), or (3) co-authoring with an individual from industry.'
They find that informal technology transfer is a function of academic seniority, especially tenure, and access to extramural research funding. 112
Other scholars suggest that informal technology transfer may be
a result of faculty malfeasance through so-called "out-the-backdoor" patenting, another method of informal technology transfer
that does not necessarily utilize formal university technology transfer mechanisms. 113 Specifically, Professors Markman, Giodonis,
and Phan found that, within their sample, 42 percent of university
scientists awarded patents bypassed their institution (i.e. they did
not assign their patent to their home university), with 33 percent of
patents originating in universities assigned to private companies
107. Rudi Bekkers & Isabel Maria Bodas Freitas, Analysing Knowledge Transfer Channels Between Universities and Industry: To What Degree Do Sectors Also Matter?, 37 RES.
POL'Y 1837, 1843 (2008).
108. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Industry and the Academy: Uneasy Partnersin the Cause
of Technological Advance, in CHALLENGES TO RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 171, 179 (Rodger G.
Noll ed., 1998); see also Jeannette Colyvas et al., How Do University Inventions Get into Practice?, 48 MGMT. SCI. 61, 68 (2002); Cohen et al., supra note 92, at 17.
109. Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson, Putting Patents in Context: Exploring
Knowledge Transfer from MIT, 48 MGMT. SCI. 44, 45-46, 48 (2002).
110. Albert N. Link et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Propensityof Academics to Engage
in Informal University Technology Transfer, 16 INDUSTRIAL & CORP. CHANGE 641 (2007).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Gideon D. Markman et al., Full-Time Faculty or Part-TimeEntrepreneurs, 55 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON ENG'G MGMT. 29, 29 (2008).

Duquesne Law Review

28

Vol. 54

(as opposed to being licensed by the university to these companies). 114 Other research finds similar results: Professors Thursby,
Fuller, and Thursby find that only 62.4 percent of patents among a
sample of faculty researchers are assigned solely to universities,
with 26 percent of patents in the sample assigned to other firms,
one third (8.6 percent) of which are assigned to firms where the faculty inventor is principal.1 15
According to the literature, these findings may be interpreted in
a number of ways, including faculty ignorance1 1 6 and cultural "dissonance." 117 Another possibility is that many TTOs regularly reject
disclosed university technology for the purposes of patenting and,
thus, return the technology back to the original inventor. 118 Further, because university technology is at such an early stage, it requires additional development. Recent research finds that the main
reason why university technology is not patented is that disclosed
technologies are "non-patentable."119 Research also shows that
even the efficacy of formal technology transfer is dependent on the
involvement of the inventing faculty members; many licensing
agreements include consulting provisions for faculty work with licensees so they may fully understand varying nuances related to
the technology and, therefore, transfer it more fully. 12 0 In summary, the Patent-Centric Linear Model represents only one of multiple pathways for the dissemination of new knowledge.
IV.

SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Beyond the university's social responsibility mission of
knowledge creation and dissemination, two components of socially
responsible technology transfer remain: the legal component and
114. Id. at 33-34.
115. Jerry Thursby et al., US Faculty Patenting: Inside and Outside the University, 38
RES. POL'Y 14, 15, 18 (2009).
116. See, e.g., Nicola Baldini et al., To Patent or Not to Patent? A Survey of Italian Inventors on Motivations, Incentives, and Obstacles to University Patenting, 70 SCIENTOMETRICS
333, 348-50 (2007).
117. See Bercovitz & Feldman, supra note 81, at 83.
118. See Bradley et. al, supra note 4, at 579-80. Though the phenomenon is not well
studied in the literature, refusing to patent disclosed technology, thus reverting back to the
inventor (and, in the process notifying the sponsoring agency) is a relatively common practice. Markman et al., supra note 113, at 32 (acknowledging this possibility and listing it as
a factor for which they are unable to account in their research).
119. Nicola Baldini, University Patenting: Patterns of Faculty Motivations, 23 TECH.
ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 103 (2011).

120. Thursby et al., supra note 115; Phone Interview with Mark Cromwell, former AUTM
President and Technology Licensing Officer, University of Virginia and University of North
Carolina (July 11, 2012).
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the discretionary component of analyzing social responsibility. The
following sections examine these legal and discretionary responsibilities in greater depth.
A.

Legal Facets of Social Responsibility Relating to Technology
Transfer
1.

Non-Profit Status of Universities

.

Society has bestowed certain benefits on higher education to encourage and support the social mission of colleges and universities.
Fundamental to these benefits is Treasury Regulation §
1.501(c)(3)-1, which designates education institutions that meet
certain criteria as not-for-profit, tax-exempt organizations. 12 1 This
section examines the criteria that specifically apply to a research
university's status as a scientific organization. Professor Peter
Blumberg has highlighted specific Treasury Regulations that apply
to the scientific mission of research universities: "[A] scientific organization must be organized and operated in the public interest.
. therefore, the term scientific, as used in section 501(c)(3), includes
the carrying on of scientific research in the public interest." 12 2
The Treasury Regulations define three criteria that may fulfill
the public interest specification: first, when research results are
made available to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis; second,
when the research is performed for the United States or other political subdivision; or third, when the research is directed toward
benefitting the public. 123 The regulations further elaborate upon
what constitutes scientific research "benefitting the public," including: (1) the scientific education of college or university students; (2)
publication in a treatise, thesis, or trade publication; (3) research
carried on for the purpose of discovering a cure for a disease; and
(4) research oriented toward the development of a geographic
area.124
In short, a research university's "formal" responsibility to society,
under Treasury Regulations, is congruent with the traditional ideals of academic science that favor open unfettered investigation,

121.

26 C.F.R.

§

1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 2014).

122. Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, From "Publishor Perish"to "Profit or Perish": Revenues from University Technology Transfer and the § 501(C)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 89, 105 (1996).

123.
124.

26 C.F.R.
Id.

§

1.501(c)(3)-1.
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open publication, and the wide dissemination of new knowledge. 125
Guidelines that scientific research be substantially related to the
education of "college or university students" comport with the training and education goals of, for example, National Science Foundation ("NSF") or National Institutes of Health ("NIH") academic research grants. 126 Finally, the emphasis on publication suits traditional norms, while "the development of a geographic area" sounds
remarkably similar to what one might consider a regional economic
and social development strategy.
Courts have provided further guidance regarding the "public purpose" criterion for the tax-exempt status of higher education institutions, with Bob Jones University v. United States1 27 perhaps
among the most influential cases. In Bob Jones University, the IRS
denied the university tax-exempt status due to practices that were
deemed to endorse certain forms of racial discrimination; the IRS's
action was upheld by the Supreme Court in an 8-1 decision. 128
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated: "Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education. . . [which] substantially outweighs
whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on [the University's]
exercise of [its] religious beliefs." 129 The Court stated, however, that
its holding dealt "only with religious schools-not with churches or
other purely religious institutions." 13 0 Of interest here are discussions relating to the purpose and benefits provided to society by
non-profit, educational institutions: "[I]n enacting . . [tax code Section] 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable
organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions
that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place
of public institutions of the same kind." 1 3 1 Justice Burger continued: "Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which
supplements and advances the work of public institutions already
supported by tax revenues." 132

125. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 203, 268-78 (1973).
126. See, e.g., NSF at a Glance, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/about/glance.jsp

(last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
127. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
128. Id. at 577.
129. Id. at 604.
130. Id. at 604 n.29 (emphasis omitted).
131. Id. at 587-88.
132. Id. at 591.
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Bob Jones University, among other cases like it,133 not only provided clarification for the Treasury Regulations' "public benefit"
clause, it also suggested that limits exist to the tax-exempt status
of higher education organizations. While the overall non-profit status of colleges and universities is unlikely at risk, rapidly growing
revenues from a variety of sources, including college sports and
technology licensing revenues, could be subject to the IRS unrelated
business income tax ("UBIT").1 3 4 UBIT was introduced in 1950,
largely motivated by the concern that allowing non-profit organizations "to operate businesses tax-free would result in a reduction of
corporate tax revenues" that otherwise would be collected from
these businesses if they operated in for-profit form." 1 35
On the contrary, Professor John Colombo finds no theoretical (or
legal) reasons that colleges and universities should not be exempt
from taxation based on revenues earned from sports. 13 6 However,
there may be policy reasons that lead Congress to use the tax code
to affect specific purposes and, thus, there is no reason why it
"should not attach special rules regarding continuing this tax-favored treatment for college athletics to affect public policy goals." 1 3 7
Similarly, Professor Blumberg suggests that formal technology
transfer practices, especially the exclusive licensing of university
technologies to single companies, seem to serve little purpose other
than to generate revenues for research universities. 1 3 8 While revenues are not inherently negative, revenue-driven activities present
an operational risk, especially when they may impede other public
benefits (such as open publication) stipulated in the Treasury Regulations. These activities may attract unwanted attention among
government regulators and may, therefore, be subject to the UBIT
or legal challenges relating to a university's tax-exempt status. 13 9
Critics have long argued for "academic exceptionalism" as it relates to IP protection. Academic exceptionalism is the idea that
universities should be treated differently, especially related to the
"experimental" or "fair use" of IP, to further their research mission
133. See, e.g., Iowa IIT Research Inst. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 13 (1985); Iowa State
Univ. of Sci. & Tech. v. United States, 500 F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
134. John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 109, 109.
135. Id. at 115.
136. Id. at 117.
137. Id. at 155.
138. Blumberg, supra note 122, at 128.
139. Id. at 108; see David Voreacos, Princeton Loses Appeal in Bid to Dismiss Tax-Exemption Suit, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Apr. 21, 2015, 3:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 5-04-2 1/princeton-loses-appeal-in-bid-to-dismiss-tax-exemptionlawsuit.
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and unique role in society. 140 As an increasing number of universities adopted the current technology transfer paradigm, however, so
withered the legitimacy of those arguments in the eyes of the law,
as demonstrated by Madey v. Duke University.14 1 In Madey, researcher John Madey became the head of Duke's Free Electron Lab,
bringing with him several patents he had filed for on his own. 1 42
After almost a decade of running the lab, Duke removed him from
the position; Madey later resigned from his academic job in 1998.143
After Madey's departure, the University continued to use most of
the equipment in his lab. 144 Madey sued, claiming that Duke infringed on several of his patents-Duke invoked the "experimental
use" defense. 145 The trial court initially ruled in favor of the University, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. 1 4 6 The appellate court held that Duke's use of
Madey's patented laser "unmistakably further[s] [Duke's] legitimate business objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects." 1 47 The opinion
further noted: "Duke . . . like other major research institutions of
higher learning, is not shy in pursuing an aggressive patent licensing program from which it derives a not insubstantial revenue
stream." 148
In other words, Duke's non-profit status was immaterial to the
court's decision because, in this case, the IP in question furthered
Duke's "business objectives." Use of this term-similar to the
UBIT-connotes that the benefits bestowed on the not-for-profit
sector are not contingent on an organization's Section 501(c)(3) designation per se, but are instead contingent on the overall intent and
impact of its actions. By the late 1990s, most major research universities (including Duke) had established TTOs and were patenting, licensing, and collecting revenues on publicly funded technologies. 149 The courts found that universities cannot have it both ways;
according to Professor Peter Lee, "[a]fter Madey, universities and
140. Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L. J. 1, 25-26 (2013).
141. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
142. Id. at 1352.
143. Id. at 1352-53.
144. Id. at 1353.
145. Id. An experimental use exception is an ancient judicial doctrine originating from
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). The current exception holds that
use of patented investigations for purposes of "amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry" do not infringe. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
146. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352.
147. Id. at 1362.
148. Id. at 1362 n.7.
149. See DENNIS PATRICK LEYDEN & ALBERT N. LINK, PUBLIC SECTOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: U.S. TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION POLICY 82-83 (2015).
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their scientists largely lost whatever privileged normative status
they may have enjoyed, particularly their claim to disinterested
stewardship of knowledge in the public interest."15 0
2.

Legal Obligations Under the Bayh-Dole Act

The Bayh-Dole Act provides a broad, legal framework regarding
the treatment of inventions resulting from federally funded research. First, non-profit universities must ensure that the inventor
(faculty researcher) discloses "each subject invention" to "contractor
personnel responsible for patent matters" and that this disclosure
is reported to the respective federal funding agency within two
months of when the disclosure is made. 15 1 Disclosure reports list
the inventor and research grant under which the disclosure was
made, a detailed description of the invention, as well as manuscripts associated with the invention either submitted for publication or published. 152 Second, the university must elect, in writing,
whether or not it chooses to retain title to the disclosed invention. 153
If the university decides to retain title, it must file a patent on the
invention and grant the government a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to the invention and agree to share
a portion of any resulting royalties with the inventing scientist. 154
If the university does not elect to take title, the government may
choose to do so, although this happens infrequently. 15 5 If the government does retain title, the university is granted a nonexclusive,
royalty-free license.15 6 If the government does not claim title, the
faculty can petition the government agency for ownership, a request
that is normally granted.157
The Bayh-Dole Act further stipulates that colleges and universities must ensure that government interests are protected. To this
end, universities must agree to: (1) confirm the government's right
to the invention, (2) require their employees to disclose inventions
stemming from federally funded research, (3) execute all papers
necessary to file patent applications on subject inventions and to
establish the government's rights to the subject inventions (if the

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Lee, supra note 140, at 58.
37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)(1) (2002).
Id.
37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)(2).
37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a)(6).

155.

37 C.F.R.

§ 401.14(d);

see also Pat K. Chew, Faculty-GeneratedInventions: Who Owns

the Golden Egg?, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 259, 294-95.
156. 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(e)(1).
157. 37 C.F.R. § 401.14.
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universities elect to take this route), (4) provide guidance to employees regarding the procedure and timelines associated with the filing
of patent applications (again, if this route is taken), (5) notify the
sponsoring agency if plans exist to abandon or not defend their patents (if patents are obtained), and (6) include on any patent application filed within the U.S. an acknowledgement to the agency
source and the related identifier (grant or contract number).1 5 8
3.

Stanford v. Roche

In Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v.
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 159 the Supreme Court provided legal
clarity to the statutory requirements of the Bayh-Dole Act. In that
case, Cetus, a small biotechnology company, developed methods for
detecting HIV/AIDS levels within the human bloodstream.16 0 In
1988, Cetus began to collaborate with scientists at Stanford University, including Dr. Mark Holodniy. 161 Prior to making use of Cetus facilities, Dr. Holodniy signed a confidentially agreement with
the company, whereby he agreed to assign inventions stemming
from his work to the company. 162 After completing his research assignment with Cetus, Holodniy returned to Stanford and continued
to develop HIV tests, assigning his work to Stanford, which filed for
and was awarded three patents for technologies stemming from his
research. 163
The HIV/AIDS diagnostic kits developed by Cetus (later acquired
by Roche Pharmaceuticals) are sold and used all over the world.164
Following an investigation, Stanford filed suit against Roche claiming that the company's HIV kits infringed on patents held by the
university.165 Roche, on the other hand, claimed that Holodniy's
agreement with Cetus gave it co-ownership of the procedure and,
therefore, Stanford lacked standing to sue for patent infringement. 166 Stanford, in turn, claimed that Holodniy had no right to
assign his work because the University was given superior ownership rights under the Bayh-Dole Act. 167
158. 37 C.F.R. § 401.9.
159. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct 2188 (2011).
160. Id. at 2192.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2193.
166. Id. at 2193.
167. Id.
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While the district court agreed with Stanford, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not, concluding that the
Bayh-Dole Act did not automatically void an inventor's constitutionally guaranteed rights to inventions, and, thus, Holodniy's assignment to Cetus (Roche) was legitimate.1 6 8 The case was accepted
for review by the Supreme Court, which also found for the defendant, Roche. 169
The Supreme Court took issue with Stanford's contention that
the "invention of the contractor" articulated within the Bayh-Dole
Act included all inventions made by contractor (university) employees with the aid of federal funds. In response, Roberts wrote: "That
reading assumes that Congress subtly set aside two centuries of patent law in a statutory definition. This Court has rejected the idea
that mere employment is sufficient to vest title to an employee's
invention in the employer." 170 Finally, the Court found that Section
202(a), which states that "contractors may 'elect to retain title,' confirms that the Act does not vest title."1 71 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Roberts stated: "The Bayh-Dole Act does not confer
title to federally funded inventions on contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to those inventions."1 7 2
The practical, immediate impact of the Stanford ruling was that
universities across the country reviewed and revised their employment contracts to ensure they covered various IP assignment contingencies related to the case. 173 More notable, however, are the
legal implications of Stanford relating to knowledge dissemination.
Justice Breyer's dissent in Stanford provides valuable context, acknowledging that IP policies should be used to promote knowledge
dissemination:
The importance of assuring this community "benefit" is reflected in legal rules that may deny or limit the award of patent
rights where the public has already paid to produce an invention, lest the public bear the potential costs of patent protection
where there is no offsetting need for such protection to elicit
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 2194.
Id.
Id. at 2190.
Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2197.
Id. The Court also found that Bayh-Dole did not grant "automatic ownership" to

universities (though they might have), "Congress has in the past divested inventors of their
rights in inventions by providing unambiguously that inventions created pursuant to certain
specified federal contracts become the Government's property. Such unambiguous language

is notably absent from the Bayh-Dole Act." Id. at 2190.
173. CARY NELSON ET AL., DEFENDING THE FREEDOM TO INNOVATE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AFTER STANFORD V. ROCHE 8 (2014).
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that invention. Why should the public have to pay twice for the
same invention? 174
In other words, Justice Breyer's concern in Stanford was that individual university faculty may ignore their employment contract
and dispose of (their) IP in ways that do not conform to the original
intent of Congress in passing Bayh-Dole. Justice Breyer assumed
that universities would generally have the interests of society in
mind in their IP management decisions, no doubt the original motivating intent of the Bayh-Dole Act:
I agree with the majority that the Act does not simply take the
individual inventors' rights and grant them to the Government. Rather, it assumes that the federal funds' recipient . .
will possess those rights. The Act leaves those rights in the
hands of that recipient . .. for a special public policy reason. In

doing so, it seeks to encourage those institutions to commercialize inventions that otherwise might not realize their potentially beneficial public use. The Act helps assure that commercialization .

.

. by imposing a set of conditions upon the federal

funds recipient, by providing that sometimes the Government
will take direct control of the patent rights, and by adding that
on occasion the Government will permit the individual inventor to retain those rights." 175

In other words, Justice Breyer articulates that the legislative
goal of Bayh-Dole is "commercialization," but does not offer any
strictures as to how this would best be accomplished other than to
say that this should be the responsibility of a university (or small
business).
Thus, Stanford not only provides legal clarification of Bayh-Dole,
it also highlights the substantial autonomy that colleges and universities have been given under the law to fulfill their fiduciary responsibility for disseminating knowledge.
B.

DiscretionaryElements of University Technology Transfer

To explore the discretion afforded by the current federal legal
framework articulated above,176 this section draws heavily from a

174.
175.

Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2200-01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2201 (citations omitted).

176. The impact of state laws and policies on university technology transfer, an area of
potential interest and impact, is beyond the scope of this article.
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comprehensive review of university technology transfer literature. 177 The prevailing policy rhetoric, supported by the extant economics and technology policy literature, tends to view technology
transfer as a "linear process " or "traditional model" dominated by a
disposition that promotes patent filing, licensing, and revenue generation. 178 A cursory scan of the legal scholarship finds little attention paid to policy alternatives that do not favor patenting, though
authors have recently explored unique approaches such as open licensing. 179
A comprehensive review of the literature finds that commentators have lamented that the linear model is at best simplistic and
at worst incorrect.1 80 While several alternatives to the current
Bayh-Dole framework have been suggested, 181 this article focuses
on alternatives available to universities within the current federal
framework articulated above. 182
1.

Do Nothing Beyond "ProtectingGovernment Interests"

Though rarely discussed in debates surrounding the dissemination of university knowledge, one option under Bayh-Dole is to
simply "do nothing" beyond adhering to the aforementioned disclosure requirements. As long as government interests are protected,
there is no reason why universities could not notify the respective
funding agency that they do not intend to claim ownership. As discussed, the government agency would then need to decide whether
or not to protect this intellectual property or allow it to revert back
to the inventor. 183 This practice occurs when university inventions
are of little immediate commercial value and patent filing and

177.
178.

See Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 575.
Id. at 572; Chew, supra note 155, at 259. According to Chew, the university believes

that to comply with these regulations, it must own the inventions. Id. at 293. For example,
the university presumably supposes that one of the instruments necessary to confirm the
government's right is a university policy assuring university ownership. Id. at 295.

179.

See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing

Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005).

180.

See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 609.

181. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University Innovations: Alternative
Approaches, 8 INNOVATION POL'Y & THE ECON. 31, 33 (2008).

182.
183.

I draw heavily from Figure 5.1. Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 621.
Chew, supra note 155, at 278. If the university does not elect to take title, the gov-

ernment may take title. In practice, the government claims title infrequently, such as in
cases where the invention supplements, parallels, or otherwise contributes to the research
that the agency already is conducting or sponsoring. If the government does not claim, then
the faculty can petition the government agency for ownership and these are normally
granted. The procedure gives title to the faculty only after both university and government

reject it. 35 U.S.C.

§ 202(d)

(2012); 37 C.F.R.

§ 401.14(b)

(2004).
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maintenance costs are high. 1 84 This also happens when a funding
agency deems research critical to the advance of science. For example, Professor Peter Lee discussed the efforts by the NIH during the
Human Genome Project to discourage grant recipients from patenting DNA sequences and keep findings within the public domain. 18 5
2.

Faculty-as-OwnerParadigm

Universities could easily choose to solely allow faculty to own
their own inventions regardless of whether or not such inventions
stem from federal funds. Inventors initially hold title to an invention made with federal support and then assign title to the university pursuant to linear model interpretations of Bayh-Dole. The
Stanford ruling showed that universities could just as easily not require faculty and staff to assign their IP to the institution. Several
other commentators also advocate faculty ownership (so-termed
"faculty free agency") as an alternative to the Patent-Centric Linear
Model of technology transfer.18 6
A common retort to the faculty ownership option is that university ownership is required in order to ensure compliance with the
legal requirements of Bayh-Dole. 187 Of course, this rationale does
not logically account for the IP that universities do not claim (albeit
after intensive administrative review). These arguments also assume that faculty will patent their inventions. First, Professor Pat
Chew finds that if faculty members choose to patent their invention,
regulations could be in place to ensure that these individuals file
the paperwork required to grant the government its derivative
rights. 188 However, similar to universities, faculty could choose not
to pursue IP protection, and instead disseminate the results via traditional publication and by working with groups outside the university to best utilize the results of their research.
Another option is for universities to explore with agencies how
they might assign patents developed by the university to faculty
inventors, companies, or non-profit organizations on their behalf.
Bayh-Dole stipulates that patents developed with federal funds
cannot be assigned without the approval of the federal agency that

184.

Phone Interview with Dana Bostrom, former Technology Transfer Office at Portland

State University, University of California-Berkeley, and University of Washington (Dec. 12,
2014).
185. Lee, supra note 140, at 84.
186.

See NELSON ET AL., supra note 173, at 11; see also Litan et al., supra note 181, at 50.

187.
188.

Chew, supra note 155, at 293.
Id. at 296.
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provided those funds, unless "assignment is made to an organization which has as one of its primary functions the management of
inventions." 18 9 Bayh-Dole does not define what this means. However, given the possibilities discussed in these sections, management of invention alternatives that would improve the chances of
knowledge dissemination could certainly be explored. Regardless
of the vehicle, the practice of faculty ownership within the higher
education context is admittedly rare. However, it is a practice employed by Waterloo University in Canada, considered one of the
most innovative universities in the world. 190
3.

University-as-OwnerParadigm

Colleges and universities could continue to mandate the ownership of faculty patent rights as a general condition of employment.
As a starting point, Professor Chew outlines a conceptual framework to explain the degree to which universities claim ownership of
faculty IP (assuming they do), including the following approaches:
*

Resource provider: Invention IP assignment depends on
the "significant use" of university resources in its creation.
This approach is based on the notion that "the university
is entitled to ownership only if it significantly contributes
to its development." 19 1 University resources are broadly
interpreted and may include the following: (direct) research funding provided by the university, university facilities, university support personnel, and projects from
specific sponsors (e.g. federally funded research). 192

*

Maximalist: Universities claim ownership of IP resulting
from (1) the course of the faculty's employment and (2)
from the faculty's use of university resources. 193 This approach goes beyond the "significant use" requirement
above to include university work, including research,
teaching, and administrative activity. 194 Faculty work
schedules are unpredictable compared to other professions and, thus, "work time" may be broadly interpreted

189.

35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012).

190. Allison Bramwell & David A. Wolfe, Universities and Regional Economic Development: The EntrepreneurialUniversity of Waterloo, 37 RES. POL'Y 1175, 1179 (2008).

191.
192.
193.
194.

Chew, supra note 155, at 276-77.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 278.
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to include activities such as academic conferences and
community projects. 195
*

Super-maximalist: A university claims ownership of any
invention developed by faculty whether or not the faculty
use university resources or develop an invention during
the course of employment. 196

While Professor Chew's framework has not been tested empirically, it nonetheless presents a useful way to understand that, even
under the university-as-owner paradigm, universities have significant latitude relating to the extent to which they claim faculty IP.
If a university obtains a patent, then it can also decide how it
chooses to license it. At one extreme, a university can choose to
exclusively license its patent to a single organization. The University of Wisconsin's exclusive licensing of its entire line of stem cells
to the biotechnology company Geron is a frequently cited example. 197 This is a common practice for a number of reasons, including
demands by licensees that exclusivity is needed for commercialization, especially related to drug development. Increasingly, many
universities also will not patent an invention unless another organization will pay for the patent costs. 1 9 8 It is thus reasonable to assume that under these conditions the licensee would expect IP exclusivity. Patents are frequently licensed exclusively to faculty and
student companies spun off of the university. 199 Finally, exclusive
licenses might be used on the premise that they may generate more
revenue for the university.
Universities can also choose to license patents non-exclusively.
Non-exclusive licensing generally ensures that inventions are
widely available to multiple organizations. The aforementioned
Boyer-Cohen patents demonstrate that non-exclusive licensing has
been successful in both generating revenue and ensuring broad
availability of discoveries, including those largely credited for the
emergence of the biotechnology industry. 200 Further, the NIH has

195.
196.
197.

Id. at 278-79.
Id. at 280.
See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The PublicDomain: Bayh-Dole Reform

and the Progressof Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 301 (2003).
198. Interview with Mark Cromwell, supra note 120.
199. Mark Edwards et al., Gold in the Ivory Tower: Equity Rewards of Outlicensing, 24
NATURE BIOTECH. 509 (2006).

200.

Kenney & Patton, supra note 27, at 1416.
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encouraged and in many cases required its grantees to widely license patented research tools and genomic inventions, especially for
further academic investigation. 201
Universities can choose to differentiate their licensing practices
depending on their goals and the intent of their licensees. For example, commentators recently proposed "equitable access" and "neglected disease" licensing approaches. 202 The former includes a provision in university licensing agreements to large companies that
would give third parties the freedom to use the licensed technology
(or any derivative product) in order to improve public health within
the developing world. 20 3 The latter would grant a research exception to those engaged in global health research of tropical and neglected diseases: the freedom to use and improve upon proprietary
university technologies.204
Finally, under the university ownership model, Professor Jacob
Rooksby discusses the decision among universities not to enforce
their patents (through prosecution)-or, at a minimum, their failure to anticipate and prepare for the possibility. 205 One possibility
is for the university to voluntarily choose not to defend their patents, raising the question of why the university patented in the
first place. 206 A second possibility, discussed by Professor Rooksby,
is that universities may be added involuntarily to third-party patent infringement cases when licensees are involved in patent lawsuits. 2 0 7 The latter case may be less of a "choice," but it is a possible
outcome under the university-as-owner paradigm.
4.

Third Party Assignment of Patents to OrganizationsOutside the University

There is no prohibition against third-party assignment of patents
so long as (1) one of the functions of the organization is "the management of inventions" or (2) the university has agency approval. 208
201.
202.

Lee, supra note 140, at 84.
Kapczynski et al., supra note 179, at 1091, 1109.

203. This approach has been suggested by so-called product development partnerships
(PDPs), organizations devoted to accelerating the development of efficacious vaccines to prevent tropical diseases in the developing world. See Christopher S. Hayter & Muhammad
Azfar Nisar, Spurring Vaccine Development for the Developing World: A Collaborative Governance Perspectiveon ProductDevelopment Partnerships(Ariz. State Univ., Working Paper,

2015).
204. Kapczynski et al., supra note 179, at 1041.
205.

See Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation:Tensions Between Universitiesand

Patents and How to Fix Them, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 312, 328 (2013).
206. Hall et al., supranote 89, at 4, 9.
207. Rooksby, supra note 205, at 326, 368.
208. 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(k)(1).

Duquesne Law Review

42

Vol. 54

In other words, a university can contract with (or transfer title to)
another entity that manages those patent rights on the owner's behalf.2 0 9 Professor Rooksby finds that this section of Bayh-Dole arguably was intended to cover separately incorporated research and
patent foundations closely affiliated with universities, and, in practice, this type of third-party assignment happens frequently. 2 10 For
example, at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF")-an organization affiliated
with but legally distinct from the university-"has first right to retain title to any inventions conceived or made in whole or in part
during federally funded [research]. "211
However, as Professor Rooksby points out, this provision also allows universities to assign patent rights to so-called Patent Assertion Entities ("PAEs"), organizations created for the sole purpose of
monetizing acquired patents by asserting infringement claims
against others. 212 Recent research by Professors Robin Feldman
and Tom Ewing focuses on one such PAE, Intellectual Ventures
("IV"). The authors find that at least fifty universities have sold or
licensed their patents (or future patent rights) to IV; the University
of California San Diego has agreements with five such shell companies. 2 1 3 Many of these universities have also invested in IV or other
PAEs as potential revenue sources. 2 14
5.

Other Options

Illustrated in Section I above, knowledge dissemination is governed by relatively broad legal and regulatory requirements. The
underlying goal of existing legal frameworks is the promotion of
knowledge dissemination and innovation. Thus, it is puzzling that
so few unique or experimental approaches have been taken (or at-

209.

Id.

210.

See Jacob H. Rooksby, When Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of University

Patent Enforcement, 46 AKRON L. REV. 169, 205 n.22 (2013).
211. UNIV. WISCONSIN-MADISON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
FOR UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 5 (2005), https://kb.wisc.edulimages/groupl56/32996/12.15IntellectualPropertyPoliciesandProceduresforUniversityResearch.pdf.

212.
213.

See Rooksby, supra note 210, at 194-95.
Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,

31; see also Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 613 (2008) (asking if universities are patent trolls-non-manufacturing entities that do not themselves make the product or develop technology-and concluding
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214. See Feldman & Ewing, supranote 213, at app. B.
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tempted) with these goals in mind. In other words, aside from several options mentioned above, universities and policymakers could
develop innovative new approaches under the current legal frameworks to improve and accelerate knowledge dissemination (not to
mention potentially increase revenues).
Professor Gerry Barnett, a former technology transfer officer, has
attempted to convince others of this potentiality. Professor Barnett
is developing an approach that segments IP rights between their
use for research and experimentation and their use to sell a product. 2 15 Conceivably, universities could usually openly license IP for
research or internal use while managing the commercial aspects of
licensing on a case-by-case basis. Further, universities might build
on recent efforts to create IP "clubs," whereby companies may pay
an annual fee that not only provides users with updates and technical support, but also may only provide an option with a commercial license to sell derivative products. Such an approach would focus attention not on how "commercially valuable" an invention
might be, but, rather, whether there is enough interest in specific
technologies to attract a critical mass of interested parties necessary to cover patent costs (perhaps buried in club fees) and other
infrastructure needed to support this type of endeavor.
Clearly, this represents only one alternative. Other approaches
might prioritize entrepreneurship and small businesses. Within
the context of the club discussed above, universities might differentiate between in-state and out-of-state companies in an effort to promote regional development. The point is that experimentation is
difficult without clear leadership, policy guidance, and shared, articulated responsibilities-but it is certainly possible.
V.

ANALYSIS

This article defines the mission of research universities as the
creation and dissemination of new knowledge. This definition is not
only well suited to the historical role of research universities, it is
also congruent with the legislative intent of the Bayh-Dole Act: to
disseminate and commercialize technologies derived from federally
funded research, among other sources. 2 16 A social responsibility
framework allows us to focus on how research universities fulfill
this mission.

216.

See Sampat, supra note 8, at 784.
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The social responsibility model requires strategic thinking: what
mechanisms or combination of mechanisms should a research university employ to fulfill its knowledge dissemination mission? The
sections above illustrate that universities have myriad options by
which they can meet their social responsibility to quickly and fully
disseminate new knowledge. However, research universities have
overwhelmingly adopted one specific interpretation of the BayhDole Act, the Patent-Centric Linear Model. 217
In many cases, individual TTOs may capably handle the management of university technology. But factors internal and external to
the model (and university), such as TTO staff turnover, changes in
university leadership, changes in patent law, and capability gaps
can transform such a linear system into an administrative bottleneck blocking, or at least slowing, the dissemination of early-stage
technologies important for economic and social development. Thus,
the Patent-Centric Linear Model is socially irresponsible. The next
sections articulate the principle reasons why this is the case, including (1) the absence of broader conceptions of university social responsibility, (2) divergent values among TTOs within the context of
social responsibility, (3) the Model's misplaced emphasis on patenting, and (4) the importance of social networks for university technology commercialization and the need for policies and programs to
reflect this reality.
A.

Absence of Broader Conceptions of University Social Responsi-

bility
As mentioned, only scant literature exists that conceptualizes social responsibility within a higher education context. 218 Little, if
any, research explores empirically how faculty, students, or administrators define social responsibility in higher education, not to
mention policymakers, community leaders, or the general public.
Furthermore, there are few systematic analyses of how, beyond the
ubiquitous three-pronged mission of teaching, research, and service, social responsibilities are specifically defined.
Practice-oriented discussions for identifying and fulfilling the social responsibilities of higher education are also lacking. This is not
surprising given what Professors Thornton and Jaeger observe in
higher education as few common references to social responsibility

217.
218.

See Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 574-75.
See Hayter, supra note 1, at 136.
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that can be "cited by biology professors, groundskeepers, and athletic directors alike." 2 19 In short, if common visions of social responsibility are not clearly articulated, then it is difficult to understand
how social responsibilities are implemented and, therefore, how
knowledge is best disseminated beyond academic publication.
This finding has important implications for this article. For
CSR-and, thus, the article's derivative university social responsibility framework-the relationship between social responsibilities
and strategy is critical; the efficacy of CSR largely depends on how
well it is integrated into core business strategies and practices. A
research university is a non-profit education and research organization sanctioned by society to meet certain social responsibilities. 220 However, if the social responsibilities of research universities are not well defined and articulated (and research shows that
they are not) then an organizational strategy is unlikely to exist.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Patent-Centric Linear Model
conflicts with other university priorities if, for example, "optimal"
knowledge dissemination and commercialization has never been defined as an overarching organizational priority.
B.

Divergent Values Among TTOs

During the 1970s and 1980s, corporations responded to increasing pressure for more socially responsible behavior by creating separate policies or organizations. 221 While CSR activities have
evolved among many companies, a balkanized, "departmental" approach to CSR remains a common practice, if companies have a CSR
strategy at all. 2 2 2 Designated policies or organizations typically reflect a specific function: corporate foundations oversee philanthropy, positions within human resources promote the hiring of
women and minorities, and, more recently, sustainability departments promote more environmentally-friendly practices. 223 Similarly, within the university context, TTOs have been created in response to a specific interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act primarily

219. Courtney H. Thornton & Audrey J. Jaeger, A New Context for UnderstandingCivic
Responsibility: Relating Culture to Action at a Research University, 48 RES. HIGHER EDUC.

993, 994 (2007).
220.

THELIN, supra note 35, at 42-43.
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See Hayter, supra note 1, at 140.
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EUR. Bus. REV. 109, 109-10 (2009).
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for the purposes of legislative compliance and revenue generation. 224

Professor Diane Swanson discusses some of the challenges of the
add-on-department approach to social responsibility. 225 First, even
when normative values (e.g. knowledge dissemination) exist, the instrumental activities of individual departments may not fit the social responsibility-oriented goals for the company. 226 Further, when
core business functions do not serve the goals of an organization
making strides towards social responsibility, then it becomes what
Professor Swanson terms an "inversion of business and society aims
. . . ."227 Inversion may be especially acute between the IPprotection orientation of a TTO compared to the overall decentralized nature of a research university that thrives on open inquiry,
information exchange, and disclosure. 228
In the present case, the oft-described function of the TTO is formal technology transfer, commercialization, and economic development, functions that are perceived as different and specialized compared to core university functions. 22 9 Individuals with technology
management and legal backgrounds are hired, many of who have
never worked within a university environment. Further, TTO personnel have a high degree of responsibility, but are also subject to
long hours, high turnover, and changing organizational dynamics. 2 30 Again, most TTOs do not generate substantial returns, if
they break even at all. 2 3 1 In short, TTOs are not well integrated
into the mainstream operations and culture of most research universities.
Given a lack of operational integration, the Patent-Centric Linear Model is subject to what Professor Swanson calls "normative
myopia," or the perception that larger organizational values are irrelevant to day-to-day decision making-especially if those values

224. See Thursby et al., supra note 115, at 15; see also Jerry G. Thursby et al., Objectives,
Characteristicsand Outcomes of University Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities,
26 J. TECH TRANSFER 59, 59, 65, 70 (2001).
225. See Swanson, supra note 45, at 510.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Bradley et al., supranote 4, at 586, 598; see also Interview with Mark Cromwell,
supra note 120.
230. See generally Bradley et al., supra note 4.
231. See Walter Valdivia, University Start-ups: Criticalfor Improving Technology Transfer, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS 6, 9 (Nov. 2013), http://www.brookings.edul/-media/research/files/papers/2013/11/start-ups-tech-transfer-valdiviavaldiviatech-transferv29_no-embargo.pdf.
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aren't clear or do not exist, as discussed above. 232 For example, absent guidance to the contrary, TTOs will likely choose to prioritize
revenue generation to offset the "losing proposition" of technology
transfer at most universities, eschewing other options for disseminating and commercializing new knowledge.
Over time, Professor Swanson observes that misaligned departments become increasingly "immunized" from and resistant to
broader organizational goals.233 Department identities solidify and
become more susceptible to vested interests outside of the organization. 234 In the case of university technology transfer, with greater
autonomy and "immunization," TTOs may be more susceptible to
an emergent professional ethos and value definitions manifest in
organizations like AUTM.
Interestingly, outside values can become embedded in broader organizational narratives. For example, when asked how universities
contribute to the aforementioned "economic development mission,"
policymakers regularly mention the emergence of the Patent-Centric Linear Model. 2 35 But of course these statements fail to recognize that other potentially more socially responsible options exist.
Thus, with misalignment, it is easy to understand why knowledge
filtering occurs in the form of slow or onerous administrative procedures, preferential treatment for the life sciences (compared to disciplines not as well-suited to formal IP protection), lack of technical
capability among TTO personnel, and faculty frustrations, including pressures to delay publication. 236
C.

Patents Have Limited Utility for Knowledge Dissemination

Research shows that patents are a critical component of the linear model. 2 3 7 This article similarly found that most legal analyses
assume that patents are the cornerstone of university technology
transfer. However, the transfer of technology (knowledge dissemination) occurs through a multitude of mechanisms, most of which
do not require formal IP protection. So why base a university technology management system on patents except to earn licensing revenues?
The traditional purpose of the patent system is to create a potential motivation for innovation by granting individuals a temporary,
232.
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government-sanctioned monopoly for their inventions in exchange
for disclosing the invention to society. 238 However, patents are not
required to motivate inquiry and invention within an academic context; university researchers are typically motivated by intellectual
curiosity and contributing their findings to the scientific commons,
not financial gain per se.2 3 9 Further, disclosure via academic publication is the primary output for academic researchers and the currency of achievement and status. 240
A separate, but related line of research finds that intellectual
property, the very mechanism meant to encourage knowledge production, may actually inhibit knowledge dissemination. For example, Professor Richard Nelson argues that scientific knowledge is a
latent rather than a pure public good, with its public and private
value largely determined by government action. 241 Thus, too little
IP protection may dwarf incentives for protection, while too much
IP control can increase the social costs associated with restricted
use. 242 Economists studying the impacts of patenting have found
that patents are a flawed measure of innovative output; particularly because not all new innovations are patented and because patents differ greatly in their economic impact. 243
Relating to specific patenting practices by industry, Professor
Bronwyn Hall and her colleagues found that firms generally rely
upon informal IP, not patents, to protect their inventions; and that
most firms use no IP at all. 2 4 4 The researchers find several reasons
for this-the first being the fundamental nature of patents. 2 45 An
invention is only the first step in a complex process in creating a
successful innovation, and a patent only describes the latter, not
necessarily the former. 246 The second is the nature of industries
and the underlying technologies themselves; while patents are important for pharmaceutical and chemical innovation, they are much
less important for innovation in other industries. Termed the "patent paradox" by Professors Hall and Ziedonis, companies instead
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patent for other strategic reasons, including to block competitors,
improve their technical reputation, and to improve bargaining
power, among other reasons. 247
In an academic context, challenges associated with IP protection
that is "too strong" (i.e. reliant on patents) may be especially acute.
First, unlike other countries, the United States does not provide a
research exception to patent rights that would allow scientists to
further advance knowledge about their invention. 2 4 8 Further, most
knowledge created in universities is "embryonic," and thus foundational to future scientific and technical progress; the filtering of new
knowledge from colleges and universities substantially increases
the social cost of innovation. 249
Oft-used arguments for the Patent-Centric Linear Model lie in
what Professor Mark Lemley terms "commercialization theory":
The act of turning a university technology into a marketable product requires industry investment and, to do this, industry requires
exclusivity through patents (and in many cases exclusive patents). 2 5 0 Research examining the value of university partnerships
to industry finds that patents and licenses generally rank low (or
last) compared to other knowledge transfer mechanisms, including
informal relationships with faculty and students, publications, and
conferences. 25 1 Moreover, U.S. companies beyond the life science
and chemical industries generally prefer other ways of protecting
intellectual property, especially trade secrets and rapid innovation. 2 52

No doubt a few university technologies, especially in the life sciences, are well suited for patenting and immediate licensing. While
"easy" examples are rare, this article does not suggest that patenting is per se socially irresponsible. However, within the PatentCentric Linear Model, TTOs evaluate all invention disclosures to
determine whether or not it will patent a specific technology, a right
of first refusal for patenting. In addition to the aforementioned
challenges, research shows that revenue generation is the primary
motivation among TTOs, as universities are increasingly utilizing
third-party PAEs, (otherwise known as "trolls") to monetize patents
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by asserting infringement claims against others. 253 Litigating IP
ownership claims is distinct from building social networks between
faculty and students and contacts outside the university who can
aid in the commercialization of new technologies. Patent and other
forms of litigation can get in the way of commercialization, so it is
difficult to see how a patent-based, litigious approach embodied
within the Patent-Centric Linear Model is socially responsible. 254
D.

Commercialization is a Team (Networked) Sport

A robust empirical literature shows that university faculties rely
upon social networks to access resources and other contacts important to their professional success. 255 Faculty involvement is critical to effective technology transfer. Specific to technology commercialization and entrepreneurship, faculty must also rely upon social
networks for resources and contacts, though these networks differ
significantly from their day-to-day professional networks. Faculty
and students that participate in commercialization must bridge a
yawning social gap between traditional, academic social networks
and more market-oriented entrepreneurial networks needed to advance their technology. 256
Recent research finds that, within many universities, TTOs are
the first point of contact related to technology commercialization
and entrepreneurship. 2 5 7 In this case, the likelihood of commercialization success is dependent on the capability of the TTO and the
composition of its network. Unfortunately, TTOs do not typically
possess the social networks needed to connect faculty to other contacts important to technology commercialization and entrepreneurship. 2 5 8 In the worst cases, reliance upon the TTO as a network
intermediary can slow or even inhibit the development of networks
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because of their priority on licensing and IP issues as opposed to
ways to best commercialize new technologies. 259
In addition, research on successful commercialization shows that
university scientists who have strong ties to industry, receive industry funding, or possess industry experience are more likely to
have commercially-relevant technology; they are also more likely to
patent, license, and establish a university spinoff.2 60 Similarly, faculty and students exposed to a wide range of commercialization and
entrepreneurship activities are more likely to be successful in the
development of university spinoffs. Formal courses, workshops,
product/technology development seminars, mentoring, funding,
and networking services, designed to promote and support academic entrepreneurship, not only provide knowledge important for
commercialization, but are also mechanisms for engaging contacts
important for obtaining resources, commercialization, and spinoff
success. 261
CONCLUSION
If knowledge dissemination and commercialization is a priority,
then the Patent-Centric Linear Model-a process that mandates
administrative review by one bureaucratic intermediary, typically
limited in their capability and networks-is far from ideal. While
faculty and students are constrained by their own professional networks, universities have the flexibility to construct new, innovative
approaches to knowledge dissemination and commercialization, the
original intent of Bayh-Dole. First, they can standardize and
streamline processes for IP protection. 262 More importantly, uni-
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versities can shift their focus away from IP protection toward building connective networks that will better enable commercialization
and spinoff success among faculty and students.
As mentioned, the contributions of research universities have
been framed in terms of economic development and, thus, seen as a
distinct function. While commercialization may be a relatively new
formalized objective for research universities, knowledge dissemination is not. So "fourth mission" language, related to technology
transfer, seems to be more of a clever public relations vehicle that
allows colleges and universities to differentiate the "unique role" of
the technology transfer office from its other core missions. Rarely
do these discussions highlight how the Patent-Centric Linear Model
affects other university missions, but its impacts-realized and potential-are tangible. First, it creates unreasonable expectations of
universities beyond their missions as non-profit education and research organizations devoted to fulfilling important social needs.
Second, it (strangely) frames the contributions of research universities in terms of licensing revenue. How does a university profiting
from revenue received from the licensing of a publicly funded technology advance the public interest? Finally, and most importantly,
it neglects the opportunity to explore other innovative, and arguably more effective, organizational approaches to accelerate
knowledge dissemination and commercialization. Only by maximizing knowledge dissemination and commercialization-likely eschewing the Patent-Centric Linear Model-will research universities fully conform to the intent of Bayh-Dole and thus be socially
responsible.

